Multiple choiceQuestion 1 · Apply
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By the end you can name the main measures that restrict risk, explain which threat each one reduces, and justify a sensible set of measures for a real organisation.
A threat is something that could do harm — a virus, a hacker, a phishing email.
Risk is how likely that harm is to happen and how bad it would be. A virus that has never been seen on your systems is a small risk; a virus that is already spreading through your office is a large one.
You cannot remove threats. You can only restrict the risk:
Good security uses several independent measures, so that one failure does not expose everything. This idea is called layered defence or defence in depth.
Match the measure to the threat. This table is the heart of the objective.
| Threat | Measures that restrict the risk | Why it works |
|---|---|---|
| Virus | Updated anti-virus software; patches; block or scan removable media; disable macros in office documents | Removes or prevents the malware before it runs |
| Spyware | Anti-spyware; anti-virus; restrict what users may install; check unexpected outbound traffic | Finds the monitoring program and cuts off its report home |
| Hacker | Firewall rules; strong authentication with MFA; close unused ports and services; patches; penetration testing; audit logs | Removes the easy ways in and makes intrusion visible |
| Phishing | User training; email spam filtering; MFA; check links before clicking; report button | The user is the target, so awareness is a real control; MFA limits the damage of a stolen password |
| Pharming | Patched operating system and browser; check the site's certificate; use a trusted DNS service; fixed bookmarks | Reduces the chance of a tampered hosts file or poisoned lookup, and makes a fake site detectable |
| Data theft or loss | Encryption; access rights; backups kept offline or off-site; physical locks | Limits what a thief can read and restores what was lost |
Notice that no single row is enough. A firewall does not stop phishing; training does not stop a stolen laptop; encryption does not stop a deleted file.
Layers cover each other's gaps.
Patching and updates. Software flaws are discovered and published; a patch closes the hole. Delaying updates leaves a known door open, which is how many real attacks succeed.
Apply updates automatically where possible, and test them first on a small group in a large organisation.
Least privilege and access rights. Each account gets only what its job needs. If an account is compromised, the attacker inherits only that account's small permissions rather than the whole system.
User education. Teach staff to check sender addresses, hover over links, expect urgency as a warning sign, and report suspicious messages. Phishing targets people, so people are part of the defence.
Backups. Keep copies on a different device, ideally off-site, and test that they restore. A backup that has never been restored is a hope, not a control.
Ransomware is beaten by a good backup far more reliably than by paying.
Monitoring and audit logs. Records of logins and file access let you notice unusual behaviour and investigate afterwards. They are also what makes accountability real.
Physical security. Locks, cable locks, locked server rooms and a clear-screen policy stop the simplest attacks of all.
Penetration testing. Authorised specialists attack the system on purpose and report what they find, so the holes can be fixed before a criminal finds them.